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Abstract
We consider a choice of options for an innovating firm in duopoly under vertical
diﬀerentiation to enter the market with or without licensing its technology for producing a
higher quality good to the incumbent firm using a combination of a royalty per output and
a fixed license fee, or to license its technology without entry. With general distribution
function of consumers’ taste parameter and cost function we will show that when the
innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry, the optimal
royalty rate per output is zero with negative fixed fee, and when the innovating firm enters
the market with a license to the incumbent firm, its optimal royalty rate is positive with
positive or negative fixed fee. Also we show that when cost function is concave, the
optimal royalty rate is one such that the incumbent firm drops out of the market; and when
cost function is strictly convex, there is an internal solution of the optimal royalty rate
under duopoly.
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1. Introduction
We consider a choice of options for an innovating firm to enter the market with or without
licensing its new technology for producing a higher quality good to the incumbent firm using a
combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee, or to license its technology without
entry also using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee under vertical
product diﬀerentiation.
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986), assuming linear demand and cost functions,
fixed license fee and cost-reducing new technology, it was argued that in an oligopoly when the
number of firms is small (or large), entry with license strategy by the innovating firm, which is
a strategy to enter the market and at the same time license its cost-reducing technology to an
incumbent firm, is more profitable than license without entry strategy, which is a strategy to
license its technology to an incumbent firm without entering the market. We think that their
definition of license fee in the case where the innovating firm licenses its technology to an
incumbent firm and does not enter the market is not appropriate. Interpreting their analysis
in a duopoly model, they defined the license fee in that case by the diﬀerence between the
profit of an incumbent firm in that case and its monopoly profit before entry and license by
the innovating firm. However, we can think that if the negotiation between the innovating firm
and an incumbent firm about the license fee breaks down, the innovating firm can enter the
market without license to an incumbent firm. If the innovating firm does not enter the market
nor license, its profit is zero. But, if it enters the market, its profit is positive. Therefore, such
a threat is credible, and hence an incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit in
the license without entry case and its profit in the entry without license case as a license fee.
In Hattori and Tanaka (2016b), using an alternative definition of a license fee taking the
above point into account, the following results about duopoly with uniform distribution of
consumers’ taste parameter, only a fixed license fee and new technology for producing a higher
quality good under vertical product diﬀerentiation have been shown.
1. Linear cost functions (constant marginal costs):
If the incumbent firm does not drop out when the innovating firm enters the market
without license, license without entry strategy is optimal for the innovating firm. This
result is converse to that in Kamien and Tauman (1986). If the incumbent firm drops out
when the innovating firm enters the market without license, both license without entry
strategy and entry without license strategy are optimal1.
2. Quadratic cost functions:
If the magnitude of the innovation is large (quality of the high quality good is suﬃ-
ciently high), license without entry strategy is optimal for the innovating firm, and if the
magnitude of the innovation is small, entry with license strategy is optimal.
In this paper we consider a more general situation of duopoly under vertical diﬀerentiation
with an innovating firm and an incumbent firm, in which the innovating firm imposes a
combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee to the incumbent firm. We analyse
1When the incumbent firm drops out of the market, the innovation is said to be drastic.
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a case of general distribution function of consumers’ taste parameter and general cost function
as well as a case of general distribution and concave cost function and a case of general
distribution and strictly convex cost function. We will show the following results.
General distribution and cost function case
1. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry,
the optimal royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is zero.
2. When the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology
to the incumbent firm, the optimal royalty rate per output is positive.
General distribution and concave cost function case
1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to
the incumbent firm, and the cost function is concave, the optimal royalty rate per output
for the innovating firm is one such that the output of the incumbent firm is zero.
2. The fixed license fee is negative.
3. License without entry strategy and entry with license strategy are optimal for the inno-
vator.
General distribution and strictly convex cost function case
1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to
the incumbent firm, and the cost function is strictly convex, the optimal royalty rate per
output for the innovating firm is positive but smaller than one such that the output of the
incumbent firm is zero.
2. The equilibrium output of the innovating firm is larger than that of the incumbent firm.
3. Entry with license strategy is optimal for the innovator.
In this case the fixed license fee may be positive or negative. Please see an example in Section
5.
In the next section we review some related studies. In Section 3 we describe the model
of this paper. In Section 4 we present the main results, and in Section 5 we study a case of
uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter and quadratic cost function as an example.
2. Literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption orR&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly. Most
of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of
means of contracts, which comprise royalties, upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two,
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and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002)
showed that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This
topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does
not have production capacity. Wang andYang (2004) considered the case when the licensor has
production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely,
when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of
royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given,
and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside
innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies
of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with
old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential
entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is
not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure
determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the
fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are
exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its
production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed
that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under
weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.
A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry was analyzed by La Manna
(1993). He showed that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower cost firm always has
the incentive to transfer its technology; hence, while a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be
fully asymmetric, there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the
other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyzed bargaining
between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. Recent research
focuses on market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et.
al. (2013) found a non-monotonic relation between intensity of competition and innovation.
Also, Pal (2010) showed that technology adoption may change the market outcome. The
social welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if
we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition may result in higher social welfare
than Bertrand competition under a diﬀerentiated goods market. Hattori and Tanaka (2015)
and (2016a) studied the adoption of new technology in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg
duopoly. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012) presented an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of research
and development (R&D) subsidies in an oligopolistic model in the cases of international
competition and cooperation in R&D. Hattori and Tanaka (2016b) analyzed problems about
product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation. Recently, Sen and Stamatopoulos (1980) presented an analysis of
royalty and fixed fee under duopoly with general demand and cost function. They did not
considered an option of the innovator whether it enter the market or not.
In this paper wewill show that a combination of non-negative royalty and negative or positive
fixed fee is optimal for the innovator under duopoly with options for the innovator to enter or
not to enter the market with or without license. On the other hand, Liao and Sen (2005) showed
that negative royalty can be optimal under oligopoly with one innovator and two incumbent
firms. When the innovator is holding relatively insignificant new technology, licensing it to
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only one firm with negative royalty is optimal. This strategy leads licensee more aggressive
and getting more profit which is paid to licensor as a fixed license fee. This negative royalty
may result in more social welfare than that where negative royalty is prohibited2.
3. Themodel
Ourmodel of vertical product diﬀerentiation is according toMussa andRosen (1978), Bonanno
and Haworth (1998) and Tanaka (2001). There are two firms Firms A and B. Firm A can
produce the high-quality good whose quality is kH , and Firm B produces the low-quality good
whose quality is kL , where kH > kL > 0. kH and kL are fixed. At present only Firm B operates
as a monopolist in the market. Both of the high-quality and low-quality goods are produced at
the same cost.
Now Firm A have three options. The first option is to enter the market without license to
Firm B, the second option is to license its technology for producing the high-quality good
to Firm B using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee, and the third
option is to enter the market with license to Firm B also using a combination of a royalty per
output and a fixed license fee. If Firm A enters the market, the market becomes a duopoly
with or without vertical diﬀerentiation. If Firm A enters with license, both firms produce the
high-quality good. If it enters without license, Firm A produces the high-quality good, but
Firm B produces the low-quality good. The cost function of the high-quality and low-quality
goods is denoted by c(·).
In the market there is a continuum of consumers with the same income, denoted by y, but
diﬀerent values of the taste parameter θ. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. If
a consumer with parameter θ buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility is equal
to y − p + θk. If a consumer does not buy the good, his utility is equal to his income y. The
parameter θ is distributed according to a smooth distribution function ρ = F(θ) in the interval
0 < θ ≤ 1. ρ denotes the probability that the taste parameter is smaller than or equal to θ. The
size of consumers is normalized as one. The inverse function of F(θ) is denoted by G(ρ). We
have F′(θ) > 0 and G′(ρ) > 0. Note that G(1) = 1.
Let pL be the price of the good of quality kL and pH be the price of the good of quality kH;
and let qA and qB be the outputs of Firms A and B.
4. Themain results
4.1. Entry without license
First suppose that Firm A enters the market without license to Firm B. Then, Firm A produces
the high-quality good and Firm B produces the low-quality good. Let θL be the value of θ
for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying nothing and buying the
2They assumed linear demand and cost functions. Their analysis about outside innovator case is extended to
general demand and cost functions by Hattori and Tanaka (2017).
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low-quality good. Then,
θL =
pL
kL
.
Let θH be the value of θ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
the low-quality good and the high-quality good. Then
θH =
pH − pL
kH − kL .
Let qH = qA and qL = qB. The inverse demand function is described as follows.
1. When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = (kH − kL)G(1 − qH) + kLG(1 − qH − qL) and
pL = kLG(1 − qH − qL).
2. When qH > 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH) and pL = kLG(1 − qH).
3. When qH = 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = kH − kL + kLG(1− qL) and pL = kLG(1− qL).
4. When qH = 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kH and pL = kL .
Since G(1) = 1, this is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ qH ≤ 1. About details for derivation of the inverse demand function please see A.3.
The profits of Firms A and B are written as
piA = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA) + kLG(1 − qA − qB)]qA − c(qA),
piB = kLG(1 − qA − qB)qB − c(qB).
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
∂piA
∂qA
=(kH − kL)G(1 − qA) + kLG(1 − qA − qB)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB)]qA − c′(qA) = 0,
∂piB
∂qB
= kLG(1 − qA − qB) − kLG′(1 − qA − qB)qB − c′(qB) = 0.
The second order conditions are
∂2piA
∂q2A
= − 2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB)]
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qA) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB)]qA − c′′(qA) < 0,
∂2piB
∂q2B
= −kL[2G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qB] − c′′(qB) < 0.
We assume that the second order conditions are satisfied in each case. Denote the equilibrium
profit of Firm B by pieB.
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4.2. License without entry
Next suppose that Firm A licenses its technology for producing the high-quality good to Firm
B using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee, and does not enter the
market. Then, Firm B is a monopolist. Let r be the royalty rate per output and L be the fixed
license fee. Suppose that the licensor can take all of the increase in the profit of Firm B due to
adoption of the new high-quality good.
Let θ0 be the value of θ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then,
θ0 =
pH
kH
.
Let qH = qB. The inverse demand function is described as follows.
1. When qH > 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH).
2. When qH = 0, we have pH = kH .
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1. About details for
derivation of the inverse demand function please see A.1.
The profit of Firm B is
piB = kHG(1 − qB)qB − c(qB) − rqB − L.
The first order condition for profit maximization of Firm B is
∂piB
∂qB
= kHG(1 − qB) − kHG′(1 − qB)qB − c′(qB) − r = 0.
The second order condition is
∂2piB
∂q2B
= −kH[2G′(1 − qB) − G′′(1 − qB)qB] − c′′(qB) < 0.
From these conditions we get
dqB
dr
=
1
−kH[2G′(1 − qB) − G′′(1 − qB)qB] − c′′(qB) < 0.
If the negotiation between Firm A and Firm B about the license fee breaks down, Firm A can
enter the market without license. When Firm A does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is
zero; however, when it enters the market without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, such
a threat is credible, and Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the royalty
and its profit in the entry without license case as a fixed license fee. The fixed license fee is
determined so that piB = pieB is satisfied, and it is written as
L = kHG(1 − qB)qB − c(qB) − rqB − pieB
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Note that pieB is a constant number. The total license fee is the sum of the royalty and the fixed
license fee. Let TL be the total license fee. Then,
TL = L + rqB = kHG(1 − qB)qB − c(qB) − pieB.
The condition for maximization of TL with respect to r is
dTL
dr
= (kHG(1 − qB) − kHG′(1 − qB)qB − c′(qB))dqBdr = r
dqB
dr
= 0.
Since dqBdr < 0, the optimal royalty rate per output, r˜
l , for the innovating firm is obtained as
follows.
r˜ l = 0.
We have shown the following result.
Proposition 1. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without
entry, the optimal royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is zero.
4.3. Entry with license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology for
producing the high-quality good to Firm B using a combination of a royalty per output and a
fixed license fee. Suppose that the licensor can take all of the increase in the profit of Firm B
due to adoption of the new high-quality good. In this case both firms produce the high-quality
good.
Let qH = qA + qB. Similarly to the previous case the inverse demand function is as follows.
1. When qH > 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH).
2. When qH = 0, we have pH = kH .
The profits of Firms A and B are
piA = kHG(1 − qA − qB)qA − c(qA),
piB = kHG(1 − qA − qB)qB − c(qB) − rqB − L.
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
∂piA
∂qA
= kHG(1 − qA − qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA − c′(qA) = 0, (1)
∂piB
∂qB
= kHG(1 − qA − qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qB − c′(qB) − r = 0. (2)
The second order conditions are
∂2piA
∂q2A
= −kH[2G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA] − c′′(qA) < 0,
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∂2piB
∂q2B
= −kH[2G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qB] − c′′(qB) < 0.
Diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) with respect to r yields
{−kH[2G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA] − c′′(qA)} dqAdr
− kH[G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA]dqBdr = 0,
− kH[G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qB]dqAdr
+ {−kH[2G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qB] − c′′(qB)} dqBdr − 1 = 0.
Solving them, we obtain
dqA
dr
=
1
∆
{kH[G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA]},
and
dqB
dr
=
1
∆
{−kH[2G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA] − c′′(qA)} < 0,
where
∆ ={kH[2G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA] + c′′(qA)}{kH[2G′(1 − qA − qB)
− G′′(1 − qA − qB)qB] + c′′(qB)} − {kH[G′(1 − qA − qB)
− G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA]}{kH[G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qB]}.
We assume
∆ > 0.
Also we assume
|kH[2G′(1−qA−qB)−G′′(1−qA−qB)qA]+c′′(qA)| > |kH[G′(1−qA−qB)−G′′(1−qA−qB)qA |,
and
|kH[2G′(1−qA−qB)−G′′(1−qA−qB)qB]+c′′(qB)| > |kH[G′(1−qA−qB)−G′′(1−qA−qB)qB |.
These assumptions are obtained from the stability conditions for the equilibrium of duopoly3.
Then,
−kHG′(1 − qA − qB) − c′′(qA) < 0, −kHG′(1 − qA − qB) − c′′(qB) < 0.
Hence, we have
dqA
dr
+
dqB
dr
=
1
∆
[−kHG′(1 − qA − qB) − c′′(qA)] < 0,
3See Seade (1980) and Dixit (1986)
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and dqBdr  > dqAdr  . (3)
We have dqAdr > 0 when −kH[G′(1 − qA − qB) − G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA] < 0 and dqAdr < 0 when−kH[G′(1 − qA − qB) −G′′(1 − qA − qB)qA] > 0. In the former case the goods of the firms are
strategic substitutes, and in the latter case they are strategic complements. These properties do
not aﬀect the main results of this paper.
Similarly to the previous case, Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the
royalty and its profit in the entry without license case as a fixed license fee. The fixed license
fee, L, is determine so that piB = pieB is satisfied. It is written as
L = kHG(1 − qA − qB)qB − c(qB) − rqB − pieB.
The total license fee, TL, is
TL = L + rqB = kHG(1 − qA − qB)qB − c(qB) − pieB.
The total profit of Firm A is the sum of the total license fee and its profit as a firm in the
duopoly. It is equal to
piA +TL = piA + L + rqB = kHG(1 − qA − qB)qA − c(qA) + kHG(1 − qA − qB)qB − c(qB) − pieB.
pieB is constant. Firm A chooses r so as to maximize piA + TL. Diﬀerentiating piA + TL with
respect to r yields
d
dr
(piA + TL) =[kHG(1 − qA − qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA − c′(qA) (4)
− kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qB]dqAdr + [kHG(1 − qA − qB)
− kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qB − c′(qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA]dqBdr
= − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qB dqAdr + (r − kHG
′(1 − qA − qB)qA)dqBdr .
If there is an internal solution of r which maximizes piA + TL, it is
r˜el =
kHG′(1 − qA − qB)
dqB
dr
(
qA
dqB
dr
+ qB
dqA
dr
)
.
We show that the optimal royalty rate is positive.
Proposition 2. When the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its
technology to the incumbent firm, its optimal royalty rate per output is positive.
Proof. Suppose r = 0. Then, (1) and (2) mean qA = qB. From (3)
qA
dqB
dr
+ qB
dqA
dr
< 0.
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Substituting r = 0 into (4), we find
d
dr
(piA + TL)

r=0
= −kHG′(1 − qA − qB)
(
qA
dqB
dr
+ qB
dqA
dr
)
> 0.
Therefore, the optimal royalty rate is positive. □
Now we consider two specific cases.
Concave cost function case
Assume that the cost functions of Firms A and B before adoption of the new technology are
c(qA) and c(qB) such that c′′(·) ≤ 0 or c′(x) < c′(y) for x > y. From (1) and (2)
kHG(1 − qA − qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA − c′(qA) = 0,
kHG(1 − qA − qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qB − c′(qB) − r = 0.
Suppose qB = 0. Then,
r = kHG(1 − qA − qB) − c′(0) = pH − c′(0),
Denote this value of the royalty rate by ¯¯r . It is a value of the royalty rate such that the output of
Firm B is just zero, that is, it drops out of the market. We call such a royalty rate prohibitive.
Also we have
¯¯r − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA = c′(qA) − c′(0) ≤ 0.
Substituting this and qB = 0 into (4) yields
d
dr
(piA + TL) = (c′(qA) − c′(0))dqBdr ≥ 0.
Therefore, the optimal royalty rate per output is ¯¯r . In this case r˜el = kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA.
Comparing ¯¯r and r˜el ,
¯¯r − r˜el = c′(qA) − c′(0) ≤ 0.
However, it is nonsense to impose a royalty larger than ¯¯r . The fixed license fee is negative as
the following inequality shows
L = kHG(1 − qA − qB)qB − c(qB) − rqB − pieB = −c(0) − pieB < 0.
It compensates the profit of Firm B in the case of entry without license.
We have shown the following result.
Proposition 3. 1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its
technology to the incumbent firm, and the cost function is concave, the optimal royalty
rate per output for the innovating firm is one such that the output of the incumbent firm
is zero, that is, the royalty rate per output is prohibitive.
2. In this case the fixed license fee is negative.
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Strictly convex cost function case
Assume that the cost functions of Firms A and B before adoption of the new technology are
c(qA) and c(qB) such that c′′(·) > 0 or c′(x) > c′(y) for x > y. (1) and (2) are rewritten as
kHG(1 − qA − qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA − c′(qA) = 0, (5)
and
kHG(1 − qA − qB) − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qB − c′(qB) − r = 0. (6)
Assume qB = 0. Then,
¯¯r = kHG(1 − qA − qB) − c′(0) = pH − c′(0),
and
¯¯r − kHG′(1 − qA − qB)qA = c′(qA) − c′(0) > 0.
Substituting this and qB = 0 into (4) yields
d
dr
(piA + TL) = (c′(qA) − c′(0))dqBdr < 0.
Therefore, there is an internal solution of the optimal royalty rate, r˜el = kHG′(1−qA−qB)qA > 0.
It is smaller than ¯¯r . From (5) and (6), qA is larger than qB.
We have shown the following result.
Proposition 4. 1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its
technology to the incumbent firm, and the cost function is strictly convex, the optimal
royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is positive and smaller than one such that
the output of the incumbent firm is zero.
2. The equilibrium output of Firm A is larger than that of Firm B.
The fixed license fee in this case may be positive or negative. Please see an example in the
next section.
4.4. The optimal strategy for the innovator
In this subsection we consider the optimal strategy for the innovating firm. The results depend
on the form of cost function.
Concave cost function case
When the cost function is concave, entrywith license strategy and licensewithout entry strategy
are equivalent. In both cases the monopolistic situation is realized. In the license without
entry case the monopolist is Firm B, and in the case of entry with license it is Firm A. Because
the payoﬀ of Firm A in the monopolistic situation is larger than its profit in the duopolistic
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situation when it enters the market without license, license without entry strategy and entry
with license strategy are optimal.
The monopoly profit including royalty revenue is maximized at zero royalty rate. Thus, the
optimal royalty rate in the case of license without entry is zero. On the other hand, in the
case of entry with license the market is duopolistic with small royalty rate. When the cost
function is concave, the monopolistic situation is optimal for the innovating firm. Therefore,
the innovating firm gets larger profit by driving out the incumbent firm from the market with
prohibitive royalty rate. Then, we need negative fixed fee to compensate the profit of the
incumbent firm that it can get in the case of entry without license.
Strictly convex cost function case
In the case where Firm A enters the market with license, setting the value of r as one such that
the output of Firm B is zero, the monopolistic situation which is the same as that in the case of
license without entry can be realized. On the other hand, the optimal royalty rate per output is
diﬀerent from such a value. Therefore, entry with license strategy is optimal.
Summarizing the results in the following proposition;
Proposition 5. 1. When the cost function is concave, license without entry strategy and
entry with license strategy are optimal for the innovating firm.
2. When the cost function is strictly convex, entry with license strategy is optimal for the
innovating firm.
In the case of entry with license the market is duopolistic, and when the cost function is
strictly convex, the payoﬀ of the innovating firm in duopolistic situation is larger than that in
monopolistic situation because partition of production between two firms is more eﬃcient than
concentration of production to one firm under strictly convex cost function. There is a positive
internal solution of the optimal royalty rate which is not prohibitive.
5. An example of uniform distribution and quadratic cost
function case
Assume that ρ = F(θ) has a uniform distribution, the (common) cost function is quadratic and
there is no fixed cost. Then, ρ = θ, θ = G(ρ) = ρ, F′(θ) = G′(ρ) = 1 and F′′(θ) = G′′(ρ) = 0.
The cost functions of Firms A and B are cq2A and cq
2
B with c > 0.
5.1. Entry without license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market without license. The equilibrium values of the variables
are as follows.
qA =
2kHkL + 2ckH − k2L
4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L
, qB =
kL(kH + 2c)
4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L
,
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pH =
(kH + 2c)(2kHkL − k2L + 2ckH)
4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L
, pL =
kL(kH + 2c)(kL + 2c)
4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L
,
piA =
(kH + c)(2kHkL + 2ckH − k2L)2
(4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L)2
, pieB =
k2L(kH + 2c)2(kL + c)
(4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L)2
.
5.2. License without entry
Suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to Firm B using a combination of a royalty per
output and a fixed license fee without entering the market. The equilibrium values of the
variables are as follows.
qB =
kH − r
2(kH + c), pH =
kH(kH + 2c + r)
2(kH + c) , piB =
(kH − r)2
4(kH + c) − L.
Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the royalty and its profit in the entry
without license case as a fixed license fee. The fixed fee, L, is determined so that pilB = pi
e
B is
satisfied. Then, we get
L =
(kH − r)2
4(kH + c) −
k2L(kH + 2c)2(kL + c)
(4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L)2
=
A
4(kH + c)(k2L − 4kHkL − 4ckL − 4ckH − 4c2)2
,
where
A =k4Lr
2 − 8kHk3Lr2 − 8ck3Lr2 + 16k2Hk2Lr2 + 24ckHk2Lr2 + 8c2k2Lr2 + 32ck2HkLr2
+ 64c2kHkLr2 + 32c3kLr2 + 16c2k2Hr
2 + 32c3kHr2 + 16c4r2 − 2kHk4Lr + 16k2Hk3Lr
+ 16ckHk3Lr − 32k3Hk2Lr − 48ck2Hk2Lr − 16c2kHk2Lr − 64ck3HkLr − 128c2k2HkLr − 64c3kHkLr
− 32c2k3Hr − 64c3k2Hr − 32c4kHr + k2Hk4L − 12k3Hk3L − 28ck2Hk3L − 32c2kHk3L − 16c3k3L
+ 16k4Hk
2
L + 20ck
3
Hk
2
L − 12c2k2Hk2L − 32c3kHk2L − 16c4k2L + 32ck4HkL + 64c2k3HkL
+ 32c3k2HkL + 16c
2k4H + 32c
3k3H + 16c
4k2H .
Denote the total license fee in this case by TLl . It is written as
TLl = L + rqB =
B
4(kH + c)(k2L − 4kHkL − 4ckL − 4ckH − 4c2)2
,
where
B =8kHk3Lr
2 − k4Lr2 + 8ck3Lr2 − 16k2Hk2Lr2 − 24ckHk2Lr2 − 8c2k2Lr2 − 32ck2HkLr2
− 64c2kHkLr2 − 32c3kLr2 − 16c2k2Hr2 − 32c3kHr2 − 16c4r2 + k2Hk4L − 12k3Hk3L
− 28ck2Hk3L − 32c2kHk3L − 16c3k3L + 16k4Hk2L + 20ck3Hk2L − 12c2k2Hk2L − 32c3kHk2L
− 16c4k2L + 32ck4HkL + 64c2k3HkL + 32c3k2HkL + 16c2k4H + 32c3k3H + 16c4k2H .
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Maximizing TLl with respect to r , the optimal royalty rate is obtained as follows.
r˜ l = 0.
Then, the fixed fee and the total license fee are equal to
L = TLl =
C
4(kH + c)(k2L − 4kHkL − 4ckL − 4ckH − 4c2)2
,
where
C =k2Hk
4
L − 12k3Hk3L − 28ck2Hk3L − 32c2kHk3L − 16c3k3L + 16k4Hk2L + 20ck3Hk2L
− 12c2k2Hk2L − 32c3kHk2L − 16c4k2L + 32ck4HkL + 64c2k3HkL + 32c3k2HkL + 16c2k4H
+ 32c3k3H + 16c
4k2H .
5.3. Entry with license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market with license to Firm B using a combination of a royalty
per output and a fixed license fee. The equilibrium values of the variables are as follows.
qA =
kH(kH + 2c + r)
(kH + 2c)(3kH + 2c), qB =
k2H + 2ckH − 2kHr − 2cr
(kH + 2c)(3kH + 2c) , pH =
kH(kH + 2c + r)
3kH + 2c
,
piA =
k2H(kH + c)(r + kH + 2c)2
(kH + 2c)2(3kH + 2c)2 , piB =
(kH + c)(k2H + 2ckH − 2kHr − 2cr)2
(kH + 2c)2(3kH + 2c)2 − L,
Also in this case Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the royalty and its
profit in the entry without license case as a fixed license fee. The fixed license fee should be
equal to
L =
(kH + c)(k2H + 2ckH − 2kHr − 2cr)2
(kH + 2c)2(3kH + 2c)2 −
k2L(kH + 2c)2(kL + c)
(4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L)2
=
D
(kH + 2c)2(3kH + 2c)2(4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L)2
.
The total license fee is
TL = L + rqB =
E
(kH + 2c)2(3kH + 2c)2(4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L)2
.
The total profit of Firm A is the sum of the total license fee and its profit as a firm in the
duopoly. It is equal to
piA + TL =
F
(kH + 2c)2(3kH + 2c)2(4kHkL + 4ckL + 4ckH + 4c2 − k2L)2
.
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About details of D, E and F please see B. Firm A chooses r so as to maximize piA + TL. We
get the optimal royalty rate as follows;
r˜el =
k4H + 4ck
3
H + 4c
2k2H
2k3H + 18ck
2
H + 24c2kH + 8c3
> 0.
With this royalty rate the outputs of the firms are
qA =
kH(k2H + 6ckH + 4c2)
2(kH + c)(k2H + 8ckH + 4c2)
> 0,
qB =
2ckH
k2H + 8ckH + 4c2
> 0.
qB is positive and smaller than qA because
qB − qA = −
k2H(kH + 2c)
2(kH + c)(k2H + 8ckH + 4c2)
< 0.
The price of the high-quality good is
pH =
kH(kH + 2c)(k2H + 6ckH + 4c2)
2(kH + c)(k2H + 8ckH + 4c2)
.
Comparing pH with r˜el yields
pH − r˜el = 2ckH(kH + 2c)
k2H + 8ckH + 4c2
> 0.
Thus, 0 < r˜el < pH .
The fixed fee and the total profit of Firm A are
L =
G
(k2H + 8ckH + 4c2)2(k2L − 4kHkL − 4ckL − 4ckH − 4c2)2
,
and
piA + TL =
H
4(kH + c)(k2H + 8ckH + 4c2)(k2L − 4kHkL − 4ckL − 4ckH − 4c2)2
,
where
G =4c2k3Hk
4
L + 4c
3k2Hk
4
L − k6Hk3L − 20ck5Hk3L − 172c2k4Hk3L − 480c3k3Hk3L
− 592c4k2Hk3L − 320c5kHk3L − 64c6k3L − ck6Hk2L + 44c2k5Hk2L + 20c3k4Hk2L
− 288c4k3Hk2L − 528c5k2Hk2L − 320c6kHk2L − 64c7k2L + 128c3k5HkL + 384c4k4HkL
+ 384c5k3HkL + 128c
6k2HkL + 64c
4k5H + 192c
5k4H + 192c
6k3H + 64c
7k2H,
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Figure 1: Relation between t and L
and
H =k4Hk
4
L + 8ck
3
Hk
4
L + 8c
2k2Hk
4
L − 12k5Hk3L − 124ck4Hk3L − 336c2k3Hk3L
− 416c3k2Hk3L − 256c4kHk3L − 64c5k3L + 16k6Hk2L + 148ck5Hk2L + 276c2k4Hk2L
+ 48c3k3Hk
2
L − 288c4k2Hk2L − 256c5kHk2L − 64c6k2L + 32ck6HkL + 320c2k5HkL + 800c3k4HkL
+ 768c4k3HkL + 256c
5k2HkL + 16c
2k6H + 160c
3k5H + 400c
4k4H + 384c
5k3H + 128c
6k2H .
The fixed license fee, L, in this case may be negative. Assume c = 1, kL = 2, and denote
kH = tkL, t > 1. Then, we obtain the relation between t and L as depicted in Figure 1. L is
negative when 1 < t < 8525679933554432 ≈ 2.54 or t > 44355658733554432 ≈ 13.22. Thus, when the magnitude
of the innovation is small or is very large, the fixed license fee is negative. Denote the profit of
Firm A and the total license fee in this case by pielA and TL
el .
5.4. The optimal strategies for the innovator
Let us compare pielA + TL
el and TLl ;
(pielA + TLel) − TLl =
c2k2H
(kH + c)(k2H + 8ckH + 4c2)
> 0.
Compare pielA + TL
el and pieA;
pielA + TL
el − pieA =
I
4(kH + c)(k2H + 8ckH + 4c2)(k2L − 4kHkL − 4ckL − 4ckH − 4c2)2
> 0,
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where
I =128c5k3H + 128c
5k2HkL − 192c5kHk2L − 64c5k3L + 64c4k4H + 256c4k3HkL − 192c4kHk3L
− 96c4k2Hk2L − 16c4k4L + 128c3k3Hk2L + 128c3k4HkL − 64c3kHk4L − 160c3k2Hk3L
+ 4k5Hk
3
L − 3k4Hk4L + 36ck4Hk3L − 32ck3Hk4L − 76c2k2Hk4L + 4ck5Hk2L + 100c2k4Hk2L
− 64c6k2L + 64c6k2H
=64c5(2k3H + 2k2HkL − 3kHk2L − k3L) + 16c4(4k4H + 16k3HkL − 12kHk3L − 6k2Hk2L − k4L)
+ 32c3kHkL(4k2HkL + 4k3H − 2k3L − 5kHk2L) + 64c6(k2H − k2L) + 4c2k2Hk2L(25k2H − 19k2L)
+ 4ck3Hk
2
L(9kHkL + k2H − 8k2L) + k4Hk3L(4kH − 3kL) > 0.
Therefore entry with license strategy is the optimal strategy for the innovating firm.
6. Concluding Remark
We have analyzed the choice of options for the innovating firm under duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation to enter themarketwith orwithout licensing its technology for producing
a higher quality good to the incumbent firm, or to license without entry using a combination
of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee. We have shown that the results depend on the
form of cost function. In the future research we want to extend the analysis in this paper to an
oligopolistic situation.
A. Detailed analysis of demand functions
If a consumer with taste parameter θ buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility
is equal to y − p + θk. Let θ0 be the value of θ for which the corresponding consumer is
indiﬀerent between buying nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then,
θ0 =
pH
kH
.
Let θL be the value of θ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
θL =
pL
kL
.
Let θH be the value of θ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
the low-quality good and buying the high-quality good. Then
θH =
pH − pL
kH − kL .
We find
θ0 =
(kH − kL)θH + kLθL
kH
.
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Therefore, θL ≥ θ0 ≥ θH or θH > θ0 > θL .
For θ > (<)θL ,
y − pL + θkL > (<)y.
For θ > (<)θ0,
y − pH + θkH > (<)y.
For θ > (<)θH ,
y − pH + θkH > (<)y − pL + θkL .
A.1. Licenses without entry case
In this case only Firm B produces the high-quality good. Let qH be the demand for the
high-quality good. Then, we get
1. When pH ≥ kH (θ0 ≥ 1), we have qH = 0.
2. When pH < kH (θ0 < 1), we have qH = 1 − F(θ0).
The inverse demand function is described as follows.
1. When qH > 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH).
2. When qH = 0, we have pH = kH .
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1. We have qH = qB.
A.2. Entry with license case
In this case both Firms A and B produce the high-quality good. Let qH = qA+ qB. The inverse
demand function is the same as that in the previous case.
A.3. Entry without license case
In this case Firm A produces the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality good.
Let qH be the demand for the high-quality good and qL be the demand for the low-quality good.
Then, we get
1. When pH ≥ kH (θ0 ≥ 1) and pL ≥ kL (θL ≥ 1), we have qH = 0 and qL = 0.
2. When pH < kH (θ0 < 1) and pL ≥ pHkH kL (θL ≥ θ0 ≥ θH), we have qH = 1 − F(θ0) and
qL = 0.
3. When pL < kL (θL < 1), pH > pLkL kH (θH > θ0 > θL) and pH − pL ≥ kH − kL (θH ≥ 1),
we have qH = 0 and qL = 1 − F(θL).
4. When pL < kL (θL < 1), pH > kHkL pL (θH > θ0 > θL) and pH − pL < kH − kL (θH < 1),
we have qL = F(θH) − F(θL) and qH = 1 − F(θH).
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From this demand function we obtain the inverse demand function as follows.
1. When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = (kH − kL)G(1 − qH) + kLG(1 − qH − qL) and
pL = kLG(1 − qH − qL).
2. When qH > 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH) and pL = kLG(1 − qH).
3. When qH = 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = kH − kL + kLG(1− qL) and pL = kLG(1− qL).
4. When qH = 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kH and pL = kL .
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable inverse demand function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ qL ≤ 1. We have qH = qA and qL = qB.
B. Details of calculation
D =4k3H k
4
Lr
2 + 12ck2H k
4
Lr
2 + 12c2kH k4Lr
2 + 4c3k4Lr
2 − 32k4H k3Lr2
− 128ck3H k3Lr2 − 192c2k2H k3Lr2 − 128c3kH k3Lr2 − 32c4k3Lr2 + 64k5H k2Lr2
+ 288ck4H k
2
Lr
2 + 512c2k3H k
2
Lr
2 + 448c3k2H k
2
Lr
2 + 192c4kH k2Lr
2 + 32c5k2Lr
2
+ 128ck5H kLr
2 + 640c2k4H kLr
2 + 1280c3k3H kLr
2 + 1280c4k2H kLr
2 + 640c5kH kLr2
+ 128c6kLr2 + 64c2k5Hr
2 + 320c3k4Hr
2 + 640c4k3Hr
2 + 640c5k2Hr
2 + 320c6kHr2
+ 64c7r2 − 4k4H k4Lr − 16ck3H k4Lr − 20c2k2H k4Lr − 8c3kH k4Lr + 32k5H k3Lr
+ 160ck4H k
3
Lr + 288c
2k3H k
3
Lr + 224c
3k2H k
3
Lr + 64c
4kH k
3
Lr − 64k6H k2Lr
− 352ck5H k2Lr − 736c2k4H k2Lr − 736c3k3H k2Lr − 352c4k2H k2Lr − 64c5kH k2Lr
− 128ck6H kLr − 768c2k5H kLr − 1792c3k4H kLr − 2048c4k3H kLr − 1152c5k2H kLr
− 256c6kH kLr − 64c2k6Hr − 384c3k5Hr − 896c4k4Hr − 1024c5k3Hr − 576c6k2Hr − 128c7kHr
+ k5H k
4
L + 5ck
4
H k
4
L + 8c
2k3H k
4
L + 4c
3k2H k
4
L − 17k6H k3L − 132ck5H k3L
− 420c2k4H k3L − 704c3k3H k3L − 656c4k2H k3L − 320c5kH k3L − 64c6k3L + 16k7H k2L
+ 95ck6H k
2
L + 172c
2k5H k
2
L − 20c3k4H k2L − 448c4k3H k2L − 592c5k2H k2L
− 320c6kH k2L − 64c7k2L + 32ck7H kL + 224c2k6H kL + 608c3k5H kL + 800c4k4H kL + 512c5k3H kL
+ 128c6k2H kL + 16c
2k7H + 112c
3k6H + 304c
4k5H + 400c
5k4H + 256c
6k3H + 64c
7k2H .
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E =16k4H k
3
Lr
2 − 2k3H k4Lr2 − 10ck2H k4Lr2 − 12c2kH k4Lr2 − 4c3k4Lr2
+ 96ck3H k
3
Lr
2 + 176c2k2H k
3
Lr
2 + 128c3kH k3Lr
2 + 32c4k3Lr
2 − 32k5H k2Lr2
− 208ck4H k2Lr2 − 448c2k3H k2Lr2 − 432c3k2H k2Lr2 − 192c4kH k2Lr2 − 32c5k2Lr2
− 64ck5H kLr2 − 448c2k4H kLr2 − 1088c3k3H kLr2 − 1216c4k2H kLr2 − 640c5kH kLr2
− 128c6kLr2 − 32c2k5Hr2 − 224c3k4Hr2 − 544c4k3Hr2 − 608c5k2Hr2 − 320c6kHr2
− 64c7r2 − k4H k4Lr − 2ck3H k4Lr + 8k5H k3Lr + 24ck4H k3Lr + 16c2k3H k3Lr − 16k6H k2Lr
− 56ck5H k2Lr − 56c2k4H k2Lr − 16c3k3H k2Lr − 32ck6H kLr − 128c2k5H kLr − 160c3k4H kLr
− 64c4k3H kLr − 16c2k6Hr − 64c3k5Hr − 80c4k4Hr − 32c5k3Hr + k5H k4L + 5ck4H k4L
+ 8c2k3H k
4
L + 4c
3k2H k
4
L − 17k6H k3L − 132ck5H k3L − 420c2k4H k3L − 704c3k3H k3L
− 656c4k2H k3L − 320c5kH k3L − 64c6k3L + 16k7H k2L + 95ck6H k2L + 172c2k5H k2L
− 20c3k4H k2L − 448c4k3H k2L − 592c5k2H k2L − 320c6kH k2L − 64c7k2L + 32ck7H kL
+ 224c2k6H kL + 608c
3k5H kL + 800c
4k4H kL + 512c
5k3H kL + 128c
6k2H kL + 16c
2k7H
+ 112c3k6H + 304c
4k5H + 400c
5k4H + 256c
6k3H + 64c
7k2H .
F =8k4H k
3
Lr
2 − k3H k4Lr2 − 9ck2H k4Lr2 − 12c2kH k4Lr2 − 4c3k4Lr2
+ 80ck3H k
3
Lr
2 + 168c2k2H k
3
Lr
2 + 128c3kH k3Lr
2 + 32c4k3Lr
2 − 16k5H k2Lr2
− 168ck4H k2Lr2 − 416c2k3H k2Lr2 − 424c3k2H k2Lr2 − 192c4kH k2Lr2 − 32c5k2Lr2
− 32ck5H kLr2 − 352c2k4H kLr2 − 992c3k3H kLr2 − 1184c4k2H kLr2 − 640c5kH kLr2
− 128c6kLr2 − 16c2k5Hr2 − 176c3k4Hr2 − 496c4k3Hr2 − 592c5k2Hr2 − 320c6kHr2
− 64c7r2 + k4H k4Lr + 4ck3H k4Lr + 4c2k2H k4Lr − 8k5H k3Lr − 40ck4H k3Lr − 64c2k3H k3Lr
− 32c3k2H k3Lr + 16k6H k2Lr + 88ck5H k2Lr + 168c2k4H k2Lr + 128c3k3H k2Lr + 32c4k2H k2Lr
+ 32ck6H kLr + 192c
2k5H kLr + 416c
3k4H kLr + 384c
4k3H kLr + 128c
5k2H kLr + 16c
2k6Hr
+ 96c3k5Hr + 208c
4k4Hr + 192c
5k3Hr + 64c
6k2Hr + 2k
5
H k
4
L + 10ck
4
H k
4
L + 16c
2k3H k
4
L
+ 8c3k2H k
4
L − 25k6H k3L − 180ck5H k3L − 524c2k4H k3L − 800c3k3H k3L − 688c4k2H k3L
− 320c5kH k3L − 64c6k3L + 32k7H k2L + 199ck6H k2L + 428c2k5H k2L + 276c3k4H k2L
− 288c4k3H k2L − 560c5k2H k2L − 320c6kH k2L − 64c7k2L + 64ck7H kL + 448c2k6H kL
+ 1216c3k5H kL + 1600c
4k4H kL + 1024c
5k3H kL + 256c
6k2H kL + 32c
2k7H + 224c
3k6H
+ 608c4k5H + 800c
5k4H + 512c
6k3H + 128c
7k2H .
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